This is not a court case, but a decision on cause of death and recommendations of the coroner under s15(1)(b) of the (then) Coroners Act 1988.  Recommendations or comments of the coroner under that provision are made for the betterment of public safety and the prevention of deaths in similar circumstances: 

"…avoidance of circumstances similar to those in which the death occurred, on the manner in which any persons should act in such circumstances, that, in the  opinion of the coroner, may if drawn to public attention reduce the chances of the occurrence of other deaths in such circumstances.” 

That enactment has since been repealed and superceded by the Coroners Act 2006, which has much the same purpose and intent.

Three qualified New Zealand Mountain Guides – two IFMGA certified, and the third a New Zealand Mountain Guides Association trainee mountain guide.  Each guide had one client (1:1 ratio). The goal of the trip was to climb Mount Tasman, New Zealand’s second highest peak.

The group set off to climb the mountain early on the morning of 31 December 2003.  There had been a recent summer snowfall at the higher altitudes, with some wind.  This resulted in isolated pockets of winds lab.  Visibility was poor.  At the time of the accident the group were pitching up the East face, in close proximity to each other.  

No recent avalanche activity had been observed and the group, along with another mountain guide with the same objective, had had discussions prior to the climb and were satisfied with the conditions such that they had no doubts about proceeding with the climb.

It was determined that a combination of the recent precipitation, moderate but acceptable wind conditions causing a degree of spindrift affecting visibility, partial and varying cloud cover with the consequent deceptive light conditions, all combined to hide the presence of the unstable snowpack which was the cause of the accident.

It was uncertain whether care in ensuring ropes did not cross, or if all anchors at the top of the second pitch had been fully established at the time of the avalanche would have made a difference to the outcome.

Reports produced in evidence indicated some disagreement as to whether any snow or ice anchor system in use today in alpine climbing is designed for or expected to hold the forces involved in such a snow avalanche.

A solicitor representing the deceased clients’ family members posed the following issues. 

a.    Was the weather such that the dangers should have been recognized? The coroner found that the weather conditions on the day hindered the recognition of potential slab avalanche; that climbing is a high-risk activity where dangers can never be totally foreseen or eliminated.

b.    Was the decision to proceed a prudent one? Yes, on the basis of what it the guides had apparently observed.

c.     Was the equipment carried and used adequate in the circumstances? The carried equipment was in accordance with current training, mountaineering and guiding practice.

d.    Were the procedures applied during the climb appropriate in the circumstances? Yes, on the basis of what the guides could observe.

e.    Was the standard of training and competence of the personnel at a satisfactory level?  Two of the 3 deceased guides were internationally recognized in their profession; the third guide was experienced and under direct supervision of the other two.  No evidence was produced suggesting that training and competence were defective in any way.

f.      Was the conduct of the guiding company appropriate in the circumstances? The coroner took this to mean the guides themselves.  The coroner pointed out that much evidence was based on supposition, and for that reason did not make any assertion that greater caution should have been applied.

g.    What improvements, if any, can be made to the procedures carried out to ensure as far as is compatible with climbing, this type of event does not recur? The coroner referred to his below findings in the report.

The coroner suggested that the following matters be considered for adoption into any mountaineering training programmes:

a.    Guides and non-guided climbers need to be continually aware of the potential for and the consequences of avalanches during the summer months at high elevations.  Climbing practices should be examined and altered if necessary to take these risks more into account.

b.    Climbers, guiding or non-guiding, need to consider the additional dangers presented by multiple ropes of climbers in close proximity and take action to reduce this risk.

c.     The New Zealand Mountain Safety Council and NZ Mountain Guides Association should look into whether current snow anchor and running belay practices in New Zealand are adequate and if not undertake a programme to improve them.

This is not a particularly influential decision, although it is considered to be one of the more serious guided mountaineering accidents in NZ’s commercial guiding history. The culpability of the guides was not established, but the coroner questioned whether the current technical climbing and guiding standards and practice took adequate account of the risks examined in this case. The NZ Avalanche Advisory service now produces year-round avalanche advisories, not just during winter.