Text of Article 2050 of the Italian Civil Code:

 “Anyone who causes harm to another during the exercise of an activity that is dangerous by its nature or by the nature of the means employed is liable for damages, unless they prove that they took all appropriate measures to avoid the damage.”

This rule imposes a regime of attenuated strict liability: the mere fact that the damage occurred during the exercise of a dangerous activity shifts the burden onto the defendant to prove that every possible precaution was taken.

Other legal principles cited:

Article 2043 c.c. (general tort liability based on negligence); Liability for damage caused intentionally or negligently.
Article 1227 c.c. (contributory negligence by the victim); Reduction or exclusion of compensation if the injured party contributed to the damage.
Article 32 of the Constitution, protecting the right to health and physical integrity. Health is a fundamental right of the individual and a primary social interest.
The Court emphasized that it is irrelevant whether an activity is listed as dangerous by legislation; the judge must assess whether, concretly, the activity or its means imply a high risk.
Moreover, even non-profit and voluntary associations must adhere to the same standards of liability when fundamental rights are at stake.

The Italian Supreme Court, in the ruling under review, rigorously addressed the issue of liability under Article 2050 of the Civil Code concerning the organization of beginner mountaineering courses, confirming that this discipline also applies to activities promoted by non-profit organizations.

The facts of the case date back to May 6, 1995, when L.A., a student in a beginner mountaineering course organized by the Società Escursionisti Milanesi (SEM), a section of the Club Alpino Italiano (CAI), lost his footing while climbing a via ferrata on the Grigna massif. He slipped along the steel cable to which he was secured and suffered a fracture to his right ankle after hitting a steel step designed to aid ascent. After attending only one theoretical lesson and with no prior practical experience, L.A. participated in this first high-altitude excursion under the organizers' guidance.

In 1997, the plaintiff brought a damages claim against SEM, which, in turn, called its insurer, Allianz, into the proceedings seeking indemnity. In 2002, the Milan Tribunal, applying Article 2050 of the Civil Code, upheld the claim, recognizing the inherently dangerous nature of the activity. The Milan Court of Appeal, in 2006, fully confirmed the first-instance judgment. SEM then appealed to the Supreme Court which confirmed the reasoning of lower courts.

SEM’s Arguments (Appellant):
SEM structured its appeal around five key grounds:

- Misapplication of Article 2050.
SEM argued that mountaineering was not legally classified as a dangerous activity, and therefore the court had wrongly applied the presumption of liability under Article 2050.
- Omission of the regulatory framework governing CAI activities
SEM contended that the CAI’s internal rules and the legislation on guides and alpine instructors (Law No. 6/1989) showed that beginner mountaineering courses were not inherently dangerous activities per se.
- Incorrect consideration of evidence regarding dangerousness
According to SEM, the courts had wrongly focused on the accident itself after the deed, ex post, rather than making an “ex ante” evaluation based on objective risk factors.
- Neglect of the distinction between beginner and expert mountaineering
SEM claimed that the appellate court had improperly assumed that the activity was dangerous merely because it involved beginners, rather than based on the actual objective difficulty.
- Failure to consider contributory negligence of the victim (Article 1227 c.c.)
SEM argued that the student's own conduct (losing footing) had contributed significantly to the accident and should at least reduce the association’s liability.

In its reasoning, the Supreme Court carefully examined the nature of the activity in question, the organizational duties of the association, and the applicable legal framework regarding liability for dangerous activities.

Firstly, the Court confirmed that the via ferrata climbing activity, especially when organized for beginners who had received only minimal theoretical instruction, had to be considered a dangerous activity under Article 2050 of the Civil Code. It stated that the assessment of dangerousness does not depend on the activity being formally classified as such by specific legislation. Rather, it must be evaluated concretely, taking into account the inherent risks of the specific activity, the nature of the equipment employed, and the experience of the participants involved. Even relatively easy climbing routes can pose significant dangers to those without sufficient practical preparation, and thus demand heightened precautionary measures from the organizers.

The Court then turned to the question of whether SEM’s non-profit and voluntary nature could exempt it from the strict liability regime of Article 2050. On this point, the Court was unequivocal: the fact that an organization operates without a profit motive does not delete or reduce its duty to ensure the safety of participants, particularly when fundamental rights such as health and physical integrity are involved. Citing Article 32 of the Constitution, the Court emphasized that any entity, regardless of its nature, must prioritize the protection of personal safety when engaging the public in potentially hazardous activities. Consequently, SEM could not invoke its social and educational mission as a shield against liability.

Addressing the burden of proof, the Court reiterated that, under Article 2050, it was SEM’s responsibility to demonstrate that it had adopted all appropriate safety measures to avoid the damage. SEM failed to provide evidence that it had implemented adequate training programs, progressive risk assessments, or any special precautions tailored to the inexperience of the participants. The decision to expose students, after only one theoretical session, to the challenges of a via ferrata, without ensuring sufficient practical preparation, was considered by the Court a serious organizational deficiency that contributed directly to the occurrence of the injury.

Furthermore, the Court rejected SEM’s argument that the injured party’s behavior should be considered contributory negligence under Article 1227 of the Civil Code. Even if the plaintiff’s slip had, in part, contributed to the accident, this did not interrupt the causal link between SEM’s organizational failings and the injury suffered. The Court made it clear that, in cases governed by Article 2050, contributory negligence must be proven by the defendant and must be of such gravity as to sever or significantly diminish the causal connection — a proof that SEM failed to reach.

In conclusion, the Court affirmed the rulings of the lower courts (Tribunale and Corte di Appello), holding SEM fully liable for the damages. The case stands as a significant affirmation of the principle that activities involving public participation must be organized with the highest possible level of care, regardless of whether they are pursued for commercial, educational, or even voluntary purposes. The emphasis placed on the concrete assessment of danger, the reversal of the burden of proof, and the prioritization of constitutional values such as health and safety, underscores the strict standard of diligence required from organizers of activities carrying even foreseeable risks.

For these reasons, the previous judgment ordering payment of €12,208.60 in compensation to the plaintiff was upheld.

It is evident that Article 2050 of the Italian Civil Code applies the strict liability regime very broadly to all activities that are “dangerous by their nature or by the nature of the means employed.” Many jurisdictions codify strict liability rules for hazardous operations or other risky activities—a broader concept, as is the case in Italy. By contrast, in common law systems such as Canada or the United States, most liability cases are governed by contractual waivers and general tort principles; no codified strict liability exists for such activities.

The most significant aspect of this case is the court’s confirmation that the same rules apply regardless of whether the dangerous activity is carried out commercially or non-commercially.